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Abstract. Agricultural producers face many risks in their economic activity due to weather conditions, plant or 
animal diseases, price volatility, policy changes and so on. One of the management tools to deal with some of these 
risks is the crop insurance system. In Catalonia (North-East of Spain) farmers’ participation in crop insurance for 
vegetables is low. Only 5 percent of the vegetables area is insured, when in Spain, as a whole, this percentage is 
around 20 percent. Different reasons have been suggested to explain this low participation ratio such as low risk 
perception, risk diversification, insurance cost or crop damage assessment rules, among others. However, no 
systematic research has been undertaken to assess farmers’ preferences for crop insurance in Catalonia. Through a 
survey of 93 vegetables farmers in the main productive areas in Catalonia, we conducted choice experiments to 
assess main farmers’ preferences for crop insurance. Each insurance policy was defined by 4 attributes: insurance 
cost; risks covered; minimum production damage level; and crop damage assessment rule. 
Results identify that insurance cost and crop damage assessment rules are among the most important factors to 
explain farmers’ behaviour toward crop insurance. These results allow us to suggest some recommendations 
specifically addressed to re-orientate the existing crop insurance policy in the vegetables sector in Catalonia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Agricultural producers face many risks in their economic activity due to weather conditions, plant or 
animal diseases, price volatility, and policy changes among others. Some factors affecting the agricultural 
sector like climate change, more market orientated CAP (Common Agriculture Policy), agricultural trade 
liberalization, restrictions on the use of crop protection products or production specialization indicate that 
risk faced by farmers may increase in the future[1,2]. Therefore, we should expect that risk management 
tools will gain importance in the coming years. There are many different instruments to deal with risks in 
the agricultural sector like production diversification, cultivate products with short production cycles, use 
of marketing or production contracts, vertical integration, future markets or insurances among others[1]. In 
this paper, we focus on farmers’ participation in crop insurance. In particular, we study farmers’ 
preferences for crop insurance.  
Previous literature on demand for crop insurance has mainly analyzed farmers’ or farm characteristics as 
factors that may affect participation in agricultural insurance. However, less attention has been given to 
farmer’s preferences for crop insurance attributes[3]. Therefore, in this paper, we try to analyze farmers’ 
preferences for crop insurance. We have taken the vegetable crop insurance in Catalonia (North-East of 
Spain) as a case study. The motivation to study this issue comes from the fact that Catalan farmers’ 
participation in crop insurance for vegetables is low. The figures show that only 5.3 %1 of the vegetables 
area is insured, while at Spanish level this percentage is 20.6 %. Catalonia is one of the last Spanish 
Autonomous Communities in terms of percentage of vegetables area covered by crop insurance (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Percentage of vegetable area covered by crop insurance in Spain and its Autonomous 
Communities in 2006. Source: Own elaboration based on Agroseguro data and Anuario de estadística 
agroalimentaria y pesquera 2007 (Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs of Spain) 
 
The Spanish agricultural insurance system can be briefly described as a combination of public and private 
agents, where the public administration through the State agrarian insurance body (ENESA) establishes, 
each year, the framework (annual plans) for the agricultural insurance system, promotes the system and 
monitors the implementation of the insurance plans and, a coinsurance pool of private insurance 
companies (AGROSEGURO) fixes the specific conditions and the premium rates for the insurance 
products, hires independent loss adjusters and, pays the indemnities. The private insurance companies 
commercialize the policies through their networks. The farmer’s participation in the system is voluntary, 
                                                           
1According to our calculations, the percentage of vegetable area covered by crop insurance in Catalonia is 5.3% (2007).  However, 
to elaborate the figure for Spain and its Autonomous Communities (Figure 1) we have used other data sources. This, and also that 
rates are referred to different years explain the difference between the two participation rates for Catalonia. 
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and the Spanish government and the Autonomous Communities governments, in order to encourage 
farmers to purchase insurance policies, subsidize almost 50% of the insurance premium[1,4, 5]. 
 
With regard to vegetable crop insurance, the Spanish agricultural insurance system provides coverage for 
all vegetables against damages caused by a wide range of risks: hail, frost, persistent rain, flooding, high 
wind, fire, virosis in tomato plant and, since 2009, wildlife damage.  
 
In 2002, a new insurance line, the vegetable multicrop policy designed to respond to the needs of the 
producers that grow different vegetable crops was introduced. However, although many Catalan farmers 
grow different vegetable crops, the multicrop policy has not improved the insurance participation rate as 
it was expected. In 2007, less than one hectare of  the 16,851 ha of the vegetable area in Catalonia2 was 
covered by this insurance line. The total vegetable area covered by a crop insurance, for that year, was 
891.5 ha2 (5.3% of the vegetable area).  
 
Different reasons have been suggested to explain this low participation ratio such as low risk perception, 
risk diversification, insurance cost or crop damage assessment rules, among others. However, no 
systematic research has been undertaken to assess farmers’ preferences for crop insurance in Catalonia. 
 
In order to elicit farmers’ preferences for crop insurance, a choice experiment was designed. Previously, 
we conducted a focus group and a meeting with agricultural insurance experts, vegetable producers, and 
Government employees, to discuss and establish the insurance attributes to be included in the choice 
experiment. Finally, each insurance policy was defined by 4 attributes: insurance cost; risks covered; 
minimum production damage level; and crop damage assessment rule.  
 
2. Methodology: The Choice Experiments 
 
The Choice Experiments (CE) characterize the object of study through a definite number of attributes 
whose combination allow creating hypothetical scenarios that will be evaluated by subjects. The 
conceptual foundations of CE rely on two main theories a) Lancaster’s Theory of Value[6], which 
proposes that utilities for goods can be decomposed into separable utilities for their characteristics or 
attributes, and b) Random Utility Theory[7], which explains the dominance judgments made between pairs 
of offerings. Based on this theoretical framework, subjects choose among alternatives according to a 
utility function with two components: a systematic (i.e. observable) component plus a random term (non-
observable by the researcher). Mathematically: 
 
( , )in in i n inU V Z S ε= +
 
       (1) 
where inU  is the utility provided by alternative i to subject n, inV is the systematic component of the 
utility, iZ is the vector of attributes of alternative i, nS  is the vector of socio-economic characteristics of 
the respondent n, and inε is the random term. 
 
Among the probabilistic choice models, the conditional logit (CL) model[8,9] is the most employed model 
for dealing with CE-sampled data[10]. Under this specification, the condition of independent and 
identically distributed (IID) error must be met according to a Gumbel (or Weibull) distribution. Such a 
distribution in the error term allows for the verification of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property, known as Luce’s axiom[11], which implies that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing 
any pair of alternatives i and j [Pr(i/Cn)/Pr(j/Cn)] is not dependent on the systematic utility of any other 
alternative within the set of alternatives Cn. To validate the IIA property, the most common test employed 
is that of Hausman and McFadden[12]. 
 
According to the CL model, the probability that an individual n will choose alternative i ( inP ) among 
other alternatives (i = 1 to I) of a set nC  is formulated as follows[8]: 
 
                                                           
2
 Own elaboration based on data of Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Action of the Government of Catalonia. 
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where inV is the systematic component of the utility provided by alternative i, and µ  is a scale parameter 
which is inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the error terms and is usually assumed to be 
equal to one[9]. 
 
Equation 2 enables the probability of choice of an alternative to be linked to its utility. To determine the 
relative importance of the attributes within the alternatives, the functional form of inV must be defined. 
The most common assumption of this function is that it is separable, additive and linear following this 
expression: 
 
in k k i
k
V ASC Xβ= + ∑         (3) 
Where; 
 
ASC =Alternative Specific Constant, representing the utility of the fixed comparator 
i = 1…I, representing the selected alternative i within the set of alternatives ( nC ); 
k = 1…K, representing the attributes which characterize alternative j; 
kβ  = model parameter of attribute k; 
k iX
 
= value of attribute k in alternative i; 
 
From (3) the basic CL model is given by: 
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By estimating the basic CL model (4), implicit prices (IP) can be obtained for each attributes and levels 
(5). These average values for the individuals in the sample can be set in ranking structure determining the 
preferences of attributes and levels. 
Product_attribute
Product _ attribute
monetary_attribute
IP
β
β
 
= −   
 
      (5) 
 
 
3. Empirical application 
 
In the empirical application, the first step is the determination of attributes and levels for farmers’ 
insurance preference. We need to clearly define the attributes that farmers take into consideration for 
contracting crop insurance. The strategy employed was to identify and specify the most relevant 
attributes. The identified attributes were subsequently discussed in a focus group and a meeting 
comprising agricultural insurance experts, vegetable producers, and Government employees. All 
participants agreed the need to include or eliminate some of the commented attributes. The final set of 
attributes was: Risks covered, minimum percentage of production damage that allow farmers to be 
compensated, crop damage assessment rule and, insurance cost. 
 
 
The second step after the identification of attributes is to determine which levels should be associated 
with. These were discussed as follow: 
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 The “risks covered” in the current situation are hail, frost, persistent rain, flooding, high wind 
and fire. We have identified other 3 groups of risks covered: one with fewer risks covered, and 
the other two with more risks covered (see Table 1). 
 
 The attribute “minimum production damage level” is defined as the minimum percentage of the 
production value loss required to take a claim into consideration. In the current insurances this 
percentage depends on the insurance line and the type of risk. Discussions in the focus group and 
in the meeting resulted in the identification of 4 minimum production damage levels: 10%, 15%, 
20%, and 25%.  
 
 The crop damage assessment rule is the way used to assess the crop damage. In order to identify 
their levels, it is worth considering that currently this assessment is carried out through a loss 
adjuster hired by AGROSEGURO. However, farmers complain that loss adjustment does not 
value the production damage adequately, as in some cases damaged production cannot be sold in 
the food chain or, if sold, perceived prices are lower. Thus, we have identified principally two 
levels: the first is based on loss adjustments rules and the other is based on commercial or market 
rules. 
 
 Finally the last attribute “insurance cost” was defined as the amount paid for each 100 € of the 
insured capital. In this context, it is not possible to define the insurance premium currently paid 
by farmers in general, because it depends on many factors such as the insurance line, insurance 
option, farm location, discounts, bonus and subsidies among others. Thus, to identify the 
appropriate levels for this attribute, we have considered, as a starting point, the total vegetable 
crop insurance premium paid and the total capital insured in the area of study (provinces of 
Barcelona and Tarragona). In 2007, these were 0.12 million € and 1.75 million €, respectively. 
Thus, in average in 2007 the vegetable insured farmers paid 6.9 € for each 100 € of the insured 
capital. From this figure and after some discussion within the focus group and the meeting, we 
have identified the following 4 insurance cost: 2 €, 5 €, 8 € and 11 € for each 100 € of the 
insured capital. 
 
Once attributes and levels were identified, a pilot questionnaire was designed and implemented to check 
for the adequacy of the experiment. No significant problems were reported. Table 1 shows the attributes 
and levels considered in this study. 
 
 
Attributes  Levels description Levels 
symbol 
Risks covered (A1) 
 Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire. Cov0* 
 Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost Cov1 
 Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost, Crop pests 
and/or diseases, Water shortage. 
Cov2 
 Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost, Crop pests 
and/or diseases, Water shortage, Decrease in prices received for 
production, Increase in production costs. 
Cov3 
Minimum percentage of 
production damage that 
allow farmers to be 
compensated 
(A2) 
 10% Dam0* 
 15% Dam1 
 20% Dam2 
 25% Dam3 
Crop damage assessment (A3)  Based on loss adjustment rules          Ass0* 
 Based on commercial rules Ass1 
Insurance cost (A4) 
 2 € for each 100 € of the insured capital 
Cost  5 € for each 100 € of the insured capital 
 8 € for each 100 € of the insured capital 
 11 € for each 100 € of the insured capital 
          *: base level 
Table 1. Attributes and levels of farmers’ insurance preference 
 
Once attributes and levels are defined, an experimental design should be applied. We need to decide how 
many alternatives and which combination of attributes and levels is included in the choice sets, and the 
final number of choice sets presented to each interviewee. Two insurance alternatives was included in 
each choice set beside a null-alternative to assure the realism of the hypothetic simulated market in the 
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experiment. The combination of the all attributes and levels is known as “full factorial design Following 
this complete design, and tacking into account the 3 attributes with 4 levels and 1 attributes with 2 levels 
(Table 1), we obtain an universe of (21x43) x (21x43) = 16,384 possible combinations for the insurance 
alternatives. This initial number of choice sets is extremely high which should be reduced using a fraction 
of it. Thus, we follow an “orthogonal fractional factorial design” to estimate all main effects, obtaining 16 
choice sets. [13]. Even so, this number still too high to be presented to the subjects[14]. Therefore, we 
separate them into blocks following a factorial blocking method. The 16 sets were divided into two blocks 
of eight sets each. Figure 2 shows one of these choice sets. 
 
ELECTION  # 1 Alternative “A” Alternative “B” Alternative  
“No election” 
Risks covered 
Hail, Persistent 
rain, Flooding, High 
wind, Fire, Frost, 
Crop pests and/or 
diseases, Water 
shortage. 
Hail, Persistent 
rain, Flooding, High 
wind, Fire, Frost, 
Crop pests and/or 
diseases, Water 
shortage, Decrease 
in prices received 
for production, 
Increase in 
production costs. 
Neither Minimum percentage of production 
damage that allow farmers to be 
compensated 
15% 20% 
Crop damage assessment Based on loss 
adjustment rules         
Based on 
commercial rules 
Insurance cost 8 € for each 100 € insured capital 
11 € for each 100 € 
insured capital 
Supposing these options are the only ones 
available, which would you buy?          
Figure 2. Example of a choice set 
 
The analysis was conducted through a face-to-face survey of 93 vegetables farmers in the main 
productive areas in Catalonia. 80 farmers have answered correctly the choice experiments and were 
introduced into the analysis assuring the equality of answers from each block of the design. 
 
 
Assuming a separable, additive and linear utility function we follow equation 3 for the econometric 
modeling. We consider only the attributes and levels as the only regressors of this function. This model 
assumes homogenous preferences across the sample, thus by estimating it every individual is assumed to 
have “average” preferences and thus the willingness to pay for the different analyzed attributes is similar. 
In this case, one implicit price or estimate exists for each attribute/level combination and for the whole 
package of insurance. This utility function in the basic Conditional Logit model, take the following form: 
 
ii
iiiiiiin
CostAss
DamDamDamCovCovCovASCV
⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
Cost1Ass1
3Dam32Dam21Dam13Cov32Cov21Cov1
ββ
ββββββ
 
where variables are previously explained in Table 1. 
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4. Results 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the basic CL model. As can be seen, at the 99% confidence level, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly or simultaneously equal to zero. We thus do not 
reject the overall significance of the model. The goodness of fit of model can be assessed through the 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 (0.073). In spite of the low results obtained, the values are similar to those 
obtained in other empirical studies[15, 16, 17, 18] and could be regarded as valid and acceptable in this type of 
application. Moreover, the result of the Hausmann-MacFadden test for both models demonstrates the non-
violation of the IIA property (acceptance of the null hypothesis). The statistical value of the test is 6.13 
lower than the corresponding χ2 with a 99% confidence level (21.66). 
 
 
 Variables Coeff. Std. 
error 
p-value 
Risk covered: Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost Cov1** -0.299 0.118 0.011 
Risk covered: Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost, 
Crop pests and/or diseases, Water shortage Cov2 0.008 0.114 0.941 
Risk covered: Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, High wind, Fire, Frost, 
Crop pests and/or diseases, Water shortage, Decrease in prices 
received for production, Increase in production costs. 
Cov3*** 0.581 0.107 0.000 
Minimum percentage of production damage that allow farmers to be 
compensated is 15% Dam1 0.179 0.115 0.122 
Minimum percentage of production damage that allow farmers to be 
compensated is 20% Dam2 -0.145 0.116 0.212 
Minimum percentage of production damage that allow farmers to be 
compensated is 25% Dam3** -0.301 0.120 0.012 
Crop damage assessment is based on commercial rules Ass1*** 0.308 0.062 0.000 
Insurance cost (€ for each 100 € of the insured capital) Cost*** -0.099 0.020 0.000 
Alternative Specific Constant, representing the utility of the null 
alternative or fixed comparator Asc 0.207 0.146 0.157 
Summary statistics 
 No. of observations 640 
 Log-Likelihood (0) -660.63 
 Log- Likelihood (θ) -612.66 
 Log- Likelihood ratio 95.93 (0.000) 
 ρ2 (pseudo R2) 0.073 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p< 0.10.  
Table2. Results of the basic CL models 
 
Results show that almost all levels’ parameters are statistically significant except the intermediate 
coverage insurance package “Cov2” level of “Cov” attribute, and the lowest minimum percentage to be 
compensated Dam1 (15%) and Dam2 (20%) levels of “Dam” attribute. The non significance of these 
levels shows an insufficient contribution into farmers’ utility function and reveals that these levels do not 
affect farmers’ preferences to insure their activities. In this same context, the non significance of the null 
alternative reveals that farmers prefer to have insurance policy, confirming them as non risk lover 
economic agent.  
 
The positive sign of coefficient implies higher levels of utility associated with its corresponding 
attributes’ levels. Thus, as expected when the insurance package include more service “Cov3”, farmers’ 
utility is greater. Moreover, crop damage assessment based on commercial rules “Ass1” increase their 
utility. The negative sign implies that an increase in the levels decrease utility. In this line, the basic 
insurance package “Cov1” decrease farmers’ utility showing a preference for a more complete service 
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contract. The negative sign of the highest damage percentage “Dam3” coefficient represents higher utility 
as the level of this attribute decreases (the lower is the percentage) showing, as expected, farmers’ 
preference for lower percentage of damage to be compensated. 
 
We should bear in mind that levels are codified using the effect coding. In this type of codification the 
reference point is defined as the negative sum of the estimated coefficients of the remaining levels. Thus, 
the utility of the reference level equals to: 
1 2 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1)Lβ β β −× − + × − + + × −L . Following this 
calculation, we can obtain the coefficient of the reference level. Thus, for instance, for the “Dam” 
attribute, the reference level “10%” have a coefficient equals to 0.1786 × (-1) + (-0.1447) × (-1) + (-
0.3006) × (-1)= 0.2666.  
 
As mentioned before, the economic interpretation can be obtained from the implicit price (IP) of each 
level of the attributes. Since these estimates are stochastic, it is usual to calculate their confidence 
intervals. In this study we employed the method of Krinsky and Robb[19] through 1000 random 
repetitions. Results are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 Attributes IP (€) 95% C.I. 
Risks covered (A1) 
IPCov0 -2.942 (-6.56 ; 0.28) 
IPCov1** -3.039 (-5.70 ; -0.89) 
IPCov2 0.086 (-1.98 ; 1.93) 
IPCov3*** 5.895 (3.60 ; 9.49) 
Minimum percentage of 
production damage that 
allow farmers to be 
compensated (A2) 
IPDam0 2.705 (-0.77 ; 6.80) 
IPDam1* 1.813 (0.05 ; 4.25) 
IPDam2 -1.468 (-3.78 ; 0.40) 
IPDam3** -3.050 (-5.80 ; -1.01) 
Crop damage assessment 
(A3) 
IPAss0*** -3.126 (-5.28 ; -1.91) 
IPAss1*** 3.126 (1.80 ; 5.04) 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p< 0.10.  
Table 3. Implicit prices and confidence intervals for attribute’ levels 
 
As shown in Table 3 the willingness to pay for the insurance cover attributes, increase when a higher 
coverage of potential damages are included as expected. Thus, farmers request a discount of (3.039 €) per 
100 € insured capital in order to accept the second group of risks offered (Hail, Persistent rain, Flooding, 
High wind, Fire, Frost). However, they are willing to pay 5.895 € to assure a whole set of risks offered by 
the insurance contract. Moreover, farmers exhibit a preference for lowering thresholds (percentage of 
damage) for which they have the right to be compensated. Results show also that farmers could accept an 
insurance contract with a 25% of damage to allow them to be compensated only if the package has a 
discount of 3.050 € for each 100€ of insured capital. Farmers also prefer to use the commercial rules for 
crop damage assessment. They are willing to pay 3.126 € for this attribute level. 
 
The previous results represent the Implicit Prices of each attributes individually. However, it is relevant to 
analyze if there are significant differences between these IP. In order to analyze these hypothesis tests, 
first we need to calculate marginal utility between each level. In a second step we calculate the IP of the 
change to go from one level to another. The marginal utility derived from the change from one level 
(L-1) to another one (L)  can be obtained by calculating the differences between coefficients, that is: 
1L Lβ β −− . To obtain the IP of this change we divide the resulting marginal utility by the coefficient of 
cost attribute as following: 1
Price
L Lβ β
β
−
−
− . The results are shown in Table 4. 
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Levels’ change Marginal Utility differences 
IP of change from levels 
(€) 95% C.I. 
Cov0  Cov3 0.871 8.837*** (4.97 ; 15.22) 
Cov0  Cov2 0.298 3.028 (-0.60 ; 7.68) 
Cov0  Cov1 -0.010 -0.098 (-4.19 ; 4.08) 
Cov1  Cov3 0.881 8.935*** (5.75 ; 14.85) 
Cov1  Cov2 0.308 3.125** (0.60 ; 6.62) 
Cov2  Cov3 0.573 5.809*** (3.05 ; 10.06) 
Dam0  Dam3 -0.567 -5.755*** (-11.11 ; -1.83) 
Dam0  Dam2 -0.411 -4.173* (-9.01 ; -0.34) 
Dam0  Dam1 -0.088 -0.893 (-5.09 ; 2.94) 
Dam1  Dam3 -0.479 -4.862*** (-9.25 ; -2.09) 
Dam1  Dam2 -0.323 -3.280* (-7.24 ; -0.60) 
Dam2  Dam3 -0.156 -1.582 (-4.77 ; 1.08) 
Ass0  Ass1 0.357 6.253*** (4.29 ; 10.03) 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p< 0.10.  
Table 4. Implicit prices and confidence intervals for change in levels 
 
As shown in Table 4, almost all changes between levels in each attribute are significant. These results 
confirm in all cases farmers’ preference founded before toward insurance contract. Thus, for “risk 
coverage” attribute, going from the lowest level of insurance service toward the complete package, 
farmers’ utility increase as expected. Moreover, farmers show a preference for the lowest minimum 
percentage to be compensated (10%). They claim a discount of 5.755 €/100 € of capital insured if the 
minimum threshold to be compensated is 25% compared with the 10% level. The results show also that 
utility change is irrelevant for threshold change from 10% (Dam0) to 15% (Dam1) and from 20% (Dam2) 
to 25% (Dam3). Finally, farmers preferences for assessment rules based on commercialization norms is 
highly significant with an IP of 6.253€/100% capital to change between levels. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion  
 
Our paper focuses on assessing the vegetables producers’ preferences for crop insurance. We carry out an 
empirical analysis using the choice experiment method, where each insurance policy was defined by 4 
attributes: insurance cost; risks covered; minimum production damage level; and crop damage assessment 
rule. The choice experiments were administered to 93 Catalan crop producers of the main productive 
areas in Catalonia, through a face-to-face survey. 80 farmers answered correctly and were introduced into 
the analysis. The results enable to identify some of the farmers’ preferences for vegetable crop insurance.  
 
Insurance attributes are important when farmers make their insurance choices.  Results demonstrate that 
farmers are likely to accept insurance policy under certain conditions. Concerning the “risks covered” 
attribute, the results show that insurance policies that cover the risk of the decrease in perceived prices 
and the increase in production cost contribute to higher farmers’ utility. Regarding the “minimum 
percentage of production damage” farmers prefer low percentages. Finally, Catalan crop producers 
clearly prefer a crop damage assessment based on commercial rules than loss adjustment rules.         
  
If we estimate the willingness to pay for vegetable crop insurance with the attributes levels similar to the 
current insurances policies3, the resulting willingness to pay is negative, which confirms the low rate of 
insurance participation in Catalonia. Catalan farmers do not appreciate current crop insurance; however, 
                                                           
3
 Risks covered: hail, frost, persistent rain, flooding, high wind and fire (Cov1); Minimum percentage of production damage (in  the 
current insurances this percentage depends on the insurance line and the type of risk): 10% (Dam0); and Crop damage assessment: 
Based on loss adjustment rules (Ass0) 
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other insurance packages can be more attractive to them. Results show that farmers’ willingness to pay 
may reach 11.7 € for each 100 € of the insured capital in the most valued crop insurance4. 
 
The current vegetable crop insurances in Spain, at least for Catalan crop producers should be modified in 
order to increase farmers’ participation in crop insurance. However, we still need to verify to what extent 
the real premiums of the proposed insurance packages are affordable by both farmers and insurance 
companies.  
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 Risks covered: hail, frost, persistent rain, flooding, high wind, fire, crop pests and/or diseases, water shortage, decrease in prices 
received for production, increase in production costs. (Cov3); Minimum percentage of production damage (in the current insurances 
this percentage depends on the insurance line and the type of risk): 10% (Dam0); and Crop damage assessment: Based on 
commercial rules (Ass1) 
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